The Venezuelan National Assembly has given initial approval to an “enabling law” which would allow President Hugo Chavez to govern by decree for one year. As Reuters notes, during his 11 years in power, Chavez has been granted such special powers three times before. This time the president maintains “fast track” authority is needed in the wake of major floods that have killed 40 and left 140,000 Venezuelans homeless.
A second and final vote on the “enabling law” (“Ley Habilitante”: full text here) is expected to occur no later than Thursday.
In a piece Monday, Frank Jack Daniel of Reuters provides a concise appraisal of the “enabling law,” as well as a preview of what sorts of legislation Chavez might “fast track.” “An emergency housing law allowing the government to seize disused land in cities, new rules to regulate the Internet and a law that will take some profits from banks are among bills currently on the parliamentary agenda,” he writes, although it is not entirely clear what might lie beyond those bills. [The Times coverage highlights the emphasis Chavez has placed on new housing legislation following devastating floods while Reuters also says a new value-added sales tax is expected to be passed – by decree or otherwise – to help fund reconstruction]. Reuters also notes that the president appears to be “within his rights” to request such powers, “at least during the next three weeks.” The principal risk, Daniel argues, is a “tarnishing” of the president’s “democratic credentials” if he chooses to use decree powers well into the next parliament.
It’s that issue which has the Venezuelan opposition furious. After proposing a one-year term for presidential decree powers, the principal opposition coalition, the Mesa de la Unidad Democrática (MUD), among others, released a statement Tuesday rejecting the passage of the enabling law. According to the New York Times the issue has opened up a “new” – albeit not unexpected – “phase of tension between the president and his critics.” While still in the minority, the opposition will take over a larger share of seats [66 of 165 seats] in the new parliament, which takes office Jan. 5.
Given the highly polarized nature of politics Venezuela – emanating both from the opposition and the ruling party – it’s often a challenge to see what’s at stake in debates such as this one. But since this will be the fourth time Chavez will assume special decree powers, history does offer some speculative clues.
As the New York Times notes, most recently, in 2008, Chavez used a decree to controversially “name regional political leaders with separate budgets, offsetting gains by the opposition in state and municipal elections.” Beginning in January 2007, Chavez exercised “decree powers” for a total of 18 months, significantly longer than what is currently being requesting (and, if I remember correctly, there was no particular “national emergency” at that time which provided special justification). The most active period of those 18 months were its final days when 26 new laws were enacted, many of which were parts of the constitutional reform voted down in 2007. In total, 67 new laws were implemented over the course of those 18 months. Among them, wrote Venezuelanalayis in 2008, were new laws on “monetary conversion, the nationalization of the steel, cement, oil, and electricity sectors, an intelligence law that was later revoked, the promotion of small and medium-sized industries and other new types of state or community-run social production enterprises, the reorganization of the national armed forces, the reorganization of national finance institutions, reforms of public administration laws aimed at trimming back bureaucracy and eliminating corruption, price controls, agricultural development policy, and food supply chain controls.” [More details about the 2007-2008 “enabling” period, from the Venezuelan Embassy in Washington]:
It’s also useful to look at critiques of that period, of which there were a variety. Shortly after the 2007 enabling law was passed sociologist Greg Wilpert did a good job explaining why the enabling law was not illegal and not, in and of itself, destructive of checks and balances. But at the same time, Wilpert argued it did create a significant “contradiction.” Wilpert: “One should note, for example, that there is a contradiction between Chavez wanting to pass laws for introducing more participatory democracy and his doing so in a way that bypasses the democratically elected legislature.” [From a position more critical of Chavez, a very similar critique was offered in 2008 by historian Margarita Lopez Maya]. Perhaps the greatest danger then, argued Wilpert, was that it would fuel polarization by “pushing even moderate critics of Chavez into the camp that believes Chavez is heading towards dictatorship.” Many of these same critiques seem to still hold true today.
Also on Venezuela:
· The Inter-Press Service reports on growing worries among some human rights activists that social protest is becoming “criminalized” in the country. The piece begins with the case of Rubén González, secretary general of the ironworkers union in Venezuela, who has spent the last year in prison after leading a 15 day strike in August 2009 to demand the” payment of wages in accordance with a collective bargaining agreement.” The protest ended with a settlement – but also González’s detainment for alleged “agavillamiento” (criminal association), instigation to commit crimes, restricting freedom to work and violating designated security areas. The human rights group PROVEA tells IPS that González’s case is one of many similar ones documented in the group’s annual report on human rights in Venezuela, which includes a special study on protests from 2000-2010. Here’s lawyer Mariana Belalba, the lead author of the study:
“The criminalisation of social protests, using the justice system, has been growing since 2005. At present, more than 2,400 people are facing prosecution for exercising their right to peaceful protest.”
According to Provea, some 19,250 protests were recorded over the decade, 71 percent of which were organized to demand social and economic rights, 26 percent for civil and political rights, and the remainder for unspecified purposes.
· In Colombia, the country’s lower house has taken the first step in approving a much-discussed law on reparations for victims of violent conflict in the country. The bill has been modified, however, to allow only those who were victims of post-1990 violence to be compensated – a decision which the left-leaning Polo Democratico rejects. The current bill also grants “equal rights to victims of violence committed by illegal armed groups and state agents,” says Colombia Reports.
· Colombia Reports also has more on new joint Colombian-Venezuelan anti-drug operations along the countries’ shared border. From Al-Jazeera, a report on new Wikileak documents which say Colombian President Alvaro Uribe seriously considered sending Colombian troops into Venezuela to capture FARC leaders in 2008. Uribe confirmed those reports, by way of Twitter, yesterday: “Reply to Wikileaks: I proposed it and I did it: to protect Colombians you must capture the terrorists where ever they are.”
· From Guatemala, an excellent report from IPS on the recent wave of attacks being made against the UN’s International Commission Against Impunity (CICIG) by members of that country’s political and economic establishment. As IPS reports, recent CICIG investigations have gone after officials in the administration of former president Oscar Berger (2004-2008) – among them former Interior minister Carlos Vielman and Alejandro Giammettei, a former director of the Guatemalan prison system. The former was in Spanish custody for a number of weeks but was recently released after the Guatemalan government failed to initiate extradition proceedings. CICIG head, Francisco Dall’Anese has slammed the government for its inaction, accusing it of “obstructing the former minister's return to Guatemala.”
· In Paraguay, a deal which appeared to have won over the opposition into voting for Venezuela’s entry into Mercosur appears to have again collapsed, according to EFE.
· Meanwhile, the regional body will be meeting later this week in Foz de Iguazu, says Mercopress, and may decide on the creation of a “High Representative” post within the organization. That person would “create consensus” among member states and be the day-to-day face of the bloc.
· Mercosur countries saw some the best economic growth performance in 2010, according to the Economic Commission for Latin America’s preliminary annual survey of the region. Overall, the study shows Latin America and the Caribbean growing by 6% in 2010, up from a 1.9% decline in 2009. Paraguay, Uruguay, Peru, and Argentina are among 2010’s regional growth leaders. Only Haiti and Venezuela saw growth continue to decline in 2010. More from The Guardian.
· The New York Times and Wall Street Journal both report on the Mexican lower house’s decision to strip congressman Julio César Godoy of immunity and his legislative duties – a decision the Times says could lead to the congressman’s arrest and trial for allegedly laundering millions of dollars for La Familia. Investigators must now try to locate Godoy.
· At the excellent new resource for organized crime watchers, InSight, Steven Dudley writes on why La Familia will continue to hold power in Michoacan after the killing of one of its leaders, Nazario Moreno, last weekend.
· And finally, in Haiti, the AP reports on a new proposal from presidential contender Michel Martelly to resolve the current electoral crisis: a re-do of the Nov. 28 elections, with all candidates participating, after the replacement of the Provisional Electoral Council (CEP). More from the Miami Herald.
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